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UNIONS AND THE DECISION TO APPLY FOR AND THE RECEIPT OF WORKERS’ 
COMPENSATION BENEFITS 
 
Abstract: Using a unique set of questions in the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 
provides some direct evidence on the mechanism through which union coverage increases WC 
receipt.  Delineating the effects of unions on the decision to apply and the receipt of WC benefits 
reveals that unions substantially increase the probability of applying conditional on injury, but 
decrease the probability of receipt conditional on applying.
1. Introduction 
Applying for and receiving Workers’ Compensation (WC) insurance in not an automatic 
outcome following a workplace injury. The structure of the WC system, the nature of the 
worker’s job and socioeconomic situation, and various other factors affect the injured worker’s 
decision to apply for WC. Likewise, factors such as the type and severity of the injury, and the 
events surrounding the injury influence decisions to award WC benefits to an applicant. A 
number of researchers have addressed the incentives injured workers face in their decision to 
apply for Workers’ Compensation. However, much of this work ignores the role of unions in 
influencing both the decision to apply for WC and the receipt of benefits.  
 
Hirsch, Macpherson, and DuMond (1997) used merged panels of the 1977-1992 March Current 
Population Surveys to estimate the influence of union status on the receipt of WC benefits. 
Limited by their data source, Hirsch et al (1997) assumed the application decision is captured by 
whether the individual receives WC. Only Lakdawalla, Reville, and Seabury (2007) have 
modeled the decision to apply separately from the receipt of benefits. The role of union 
membership was secondary to their focus on the influence of individual health insurance on WC 
filing, and their analysis stopped with the decision to apply. Here I make use of a set of questions 
in the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 to estimate a union’s influence on the 
decision to apply and, conditional on applying, the receipt of benefits. 
 
Today, about 97% of workers are covered by either their state's WC program, or by one of two 
Federal WC programs (Meyer 2002).  Eligibility begins immediately with employment; unlike 
unemployment insurance laws there is no work history requirement.  By law the employer is 
liable to the employee for losses associated with a workplace injury, and (in most states) is 
required to purchase insurance to cover this liability (Biddle 2001).  Generally, the injured 
employee must notify their employer, file the claim with the appropriate agency, and submit to 
examination by an appropriate physician.  The process varies by state, and can be quite complex.   
 
Unions play several important roles in the case of a workplace injury.  The union provides the 
collective voice for workers to better communicate with the employer (Budd 2007). Without 
unions, workers may be less likely to request non-pecuniary benefits, such as improved 
workplace safety or accommodations for injured workers, for fear of retaliation. As Hirsch et al 
(1997) note, due to the threat of union grievance “(m)anagers are not likely to discourage 
legitimate claims for workers’ compensation…” and managers would be less likely “to monitor 
and penalize workers for questionable claims.” Second, as Budd (2007) notes, “labor unions can 
facilitate workers’ knowledge and use of existing benefits.” Kramer (2008) shows union 
members are more likely to be aware of their parental leave benefits provided under the Family 
and Medical Leave Act, while Gustman and Steinmeier (2005) found union employees have 
greater knowledge of their social security and pension benefits. Both the collective voice and the 
facilitation of information by unions suggest that union members, all else equal, should have a 
higher probability of filing a workers’ compensation claim. 
 
Conditional on applying, is there a role for unions in influencing the receipt of benefits? The 
facilitation role of the union, as mentioned, provides support for the worker should the employer 
challenge the claim. Union representatives may also have legal access to information that might 
strengthen an application, including safety records, data on a plant's hazardous conditions, and 
the firm's past WC experiences. Collective bargaining agreements may contain provisions that 
streamline the application process, reducing the likelihood of application errors. In contrast, by 
facilitating the application process, unions may increase the number of unqualified claims. 
 
3. Data and Estimation Issues 
The National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 (NLSY79) consists of a sample of American 
men and women born in the late 1950's and early 1960's that was nationally representative as of 
1979. From 1988 to 2000 the NLSY79 asked a unique series of questions about on-the-job injury 
or illness, including information about what month and year it occurred, whether (and how 
many) days of work were missed, whether the worker had applied for Workers’ Compensation, 
and whether the worker received these benefits. The sample used in this analysis is similar to 
previous work using these questions, and excludes individuals who were in the military, farmers, 
or self employed between 1987 and 2000. 
 
Much of the literature on the incentive effects of workers’ compensation estimates a probit 
equation: 
)()( itititit KXbenefitspr εδβ ++Φ=        (1) 
where benefitsit is an indicator variable equal to one if the individual receives WC benefits, and 0 
otherwise; Xit is a vector of control variables; and Kit is the key variable or variables of interest 
(which is separated from Xit only for expositional emphasis). There are two notable drawbacks to 
estimating this equation that usually arise as a result of the data source. Union members have 
been shown to work in more hazardous conditions and are more likely to suffer an injury or 
illness caused by a job hazard (Worrall and Butler 1983), which could lead to higher rates of 
workers' compensation applications. Others have argued that unions can effectively reduce 
workplace hazards by negotiating safer work environments (Campolieti 2005), which could lead 
to fewer workers' compensation applications. In either case, restricting the sample to injured 
workers should remove the bias in the union effect that would result from working under more 
(or less) hazardous conditions.  
 
Second, without the application decision explicitly documented separately from the receipt of 
benefits, the researcher cannot differentiate between the effect a variable has on the decision to 
apply for WC and whether the individual received benefits once an application has been filed. 
With the availability of this information in the NLSY79, we can separate these two effects by 
first estimating: 
)()1|( ititititit KXinjuredapplypr εδβ ++Φ==      (2) 
where applyit is an indicator variable equal to one if the individual applied for WC, and injuredit 
is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the individual reported suffering an injury at work. Then 
estimating: 
)()1|( ititititit KXapplybenefitspr εδβ ++Φ==      (3) 
where benefitsit equals one if the individual received WC benefits, and the sample is restricted to 
only those injured men who apply for WC. Estimating equations (2) and (3) separates whether 
union membership significantly influences an injured worker’s decision to apply for WC from, 
conditional on applying, whether being in a union can influence the probability of receiving WC 
benefits.  
 
4. Empirical Results 
Estimating equation (1) for both injured and uninjured workers is comparable to Hirsch et al. 
(1997), and provides a starting point for comparing the results from estimating equations (1) – 
(3) for various sample restrictions.1 Like Hirsch, et al. (1997), estimating the unconditional 
probability of receiving WC benefits using a sample of all workers (first row, column 1) results 
in a significant positive relationship between union membership and the receipt of benefits. In 
addition, the marginal effect of union membership on the unconditional receipt of WC benefits, 
0.0056, is similar to the 0.0062 – 0.0067 marginal effects Hirsch et al. (1997) found.  Union 
membership is also significantly positively related to the probability of applying for WC (first 
row, column 2), and the marginal effect (0.014) is about 2.5 times as large as the unconditional 
effect on receiving benefits.  
 
The relationship between union membership and the decision to apply for WC increases from 
0.014 to 0.096 once the sample is restricted to injured workers. This is the ideal specification for 
determining the impact of union membership on the decision to apply for WC.  Estimated at the 
mean application rate of 0.5912 for non-union workers, the marginal effect implies that union 
workers are 17% more likely to apply than nonunion workers.   
 
Conditional on applying for WC, there is a negative relationship between union membership and 
the receipt of benefits. While this relationship is not statistically significant, it is consistently 
negative across a variety of sample restrictions2 suggesting that unions decrease the likelihood of 
receipt conditional on applying. 
 
5. Conclusions 
In general, these results suggest that previous research that has estimated WC decisions are 
missing an important distinction if they cannot separate out the application decision from the 
receipt of benefits, and if they cannot separate out the injured from the uninjured.  The marginal 
effect of union membership on the probability that the injured worker applies for WC is two to 
three times as large as the marginal effect of union membership on the unconditional probability 
                                                 
1 The results of estimating equations (1)-(3) are presented in table 1, where only the coefficients on union status are 
reported. Full results are available from the author upon request. 
2 Equation (3) was estimated separately for injured workers who missed work due to injury, with a high school 
diploma or less, with more than a high school diploma, in blue collar occupations, and in white collar occupations. 
that the injured worker receives benefits.  However, there appears to be a negative impact of 
union membership on the receipt of WC benefits conditional on applying.  Because unions 
inform workers about WC and protect workers from employee pressures, it is more likely they 
would apply for WC benefits where the injury is more ambiguous or difficult to authenticate 
relative to non union workers. This would help explain the apparent negative impact of union 
membership on the receipt of WC benefits conditional on applying. 
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Table 1: Role of union membership on WC application and benefits decisions   
   Dependent Variable 
  pr(benefits) pr(apply) pr(benefits | apply=1)
Sample:  marginal impact of union membership variable: 
All Workers  0.006 *** 0.014 *** -0.017    
  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.035)   
NT  [50,902]  [50,902]  [1460]   
 
 
Injured Workers Only  0.037  0.096 ** -0.017   
  (0.027)  (0.027)  (0.035)   
NT  [2389]  [2389]  [1460]   
       
Notes: All estimates include controls for year, industry, occupation, tenure, firm size, education, race, age, region of 
residence, marital status, existing health limitation, log earnings, and log non-labor income. Standard errors in 
parentheses. Sample sizes in brackets. 
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
